Are International Appointments Institutional Achievements or Protocol-Based Incentive Measures?

Sayed Yousuf Almuhafdha*

The United Nations, like many governmental and international institutions, relies on a range of incentive mechanisms to encouragestates and national institutions to comply with human rights standards. They include appointments, honorary memberships, and awards not necessarily granted for genuine institutional performance or tangible outcomes. Rather, they are often the product of diplomatic prioritization, intergovernmental voting, or consensus among members of permanent missions and regional alliances. Characterizing these appointments as “achievements” is worthy of skepticism.

In the human rights context, institutional achievements should not be measured by titles or positions, but by the extent to which they effectively protect human rights, strengthen accountability, and meaningfully contribute to ending impunity.

In principle, ombudsman offices and grievance mechanisms are entrusted with promoting the rule of law and entrenching accountability and good governance as core components of the criminal justice system and independent national remedy mechanisms. According to the mandates outlined on its official website, the Ombudsman’s Office in Bahrain is responsible for receiving complaints related to abuses and violations committed by members of Bahrain’s security forces, particularly in places of detention, as well as handling requests for assistance concerning detainees’ rights to healthcare, education, family visits, and other fundamental rights.

However, an objective assessment of the Ombudsman’s performance,based on long-term field monitoring, direct engagement with victims, and testimonies from independent human rights organizations, including international Organizations, reveals serious failures in responding to the majority of complaints submitted, including incidents of torture. The Ombudsman has failed to address numerouscases involving ill-treatment, torture, and temporary release of prisoners following the death of a first-degree relative. Moreover, it has consistently failed to hold perpetrators accountable in more than one hundred documented human rights cases.

Among them is the recent case of the child Hussein Mahdi, who was subjected to beating and ill-treatment at Dry Dock Prison, which was formally documented with the Ombudsman’s Office. Another involves Ali Dawood, a victim of torture at Jau Central Prison, whose ill-treatment in November of last year received no meaningful attention or follow-up from the Ombudsman. These failures have intensified doubts and deepened frustration regarding the institution’s commitment to the mandate for which it was originally established. These concerns align with warnings raised by UN experts, who have repeatedly issued statements on the harsh conditions faced by prisoners at Jau Central Prison amid the Ombudsman’s failure to secure even the most basic rights guaranteed under the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules).

It is also notable that the few positive responses recorded in cases,such as remedying the denial of medical treatment to prisoners of conscience by prison authorities, were linked to external interventions by international human rights organizations, Western parliaments, or government bodies, particularly follow-up by members of the British Parliament and interest from the UK Foreign Office, including direct communication between these actors and their representative and the Ombudsman’s Office. This pattern raises serious concerns that the institution may be more focused on improving its international image and responding to diplomatic pressure than on fulfilling its core role of providing justice, protection, and support to victims.

Further concerns arise from the institution’s public statements following field visits to detention facilities, which frequently reproduce the narrative of security authorities without offering independent or critical assessments of documented violations. These concerns are compounded by the fact that the Ombudsman’s annual report is not made public, but submitted exclusively to the Minister of Interior, despite the latter bearing direct responsibility for human rights violations that have been subject to international condemnation and calls for the application of international accountability mechanisms, including the Magnitsky Act.

This fundamental problem is not limited to practice alone; it extends to the institution’s structural design. Ombudsman members are appointed by Bahrain’s executive branch, represented by the Minister of Interior, rather than by the Bahraini parliament, as is standard in democracies. This, paired with the absence of financial independence, limited professional competence, lack of meaningful human rights or community contributions, and the absence of public credibility in the field of human rights, has resulted in a clear conflict of interest. These factors have hollowed out the Ombudsman’s independence and transformed it into a public relations tool, focused on hosting foreign parliamentary delegations and seeking international recognition and appointments rather than seriously advancing legal remedies and activating national accountability mechanisms that promote and protect human rights and fulfill its mandate.

Accordingly, describing these international appointments as an achievement is not grounded in an objective assessment of the institution’s human rights performance. Instead, it falls within a broader protocol-based and encouragement-oriented framework, reflecting political and diplomatic considerations more than concrete progress in protecting human rights or consolidating justice and the rule of law.

*Human Rights researcher and SALAM DHR Advisory Group member